Philosophy of Hinduism 1

Philosophy of Hinduism
I
What is the philosophy of Hinduism? This is a question which arises in its logical
sequence. But apart from its logical sequence its importance is such that it can
never be omitted from consideration. Without it no one can understand the aims and
ideals of Hinduism.
It is obvious that such a study must be preceded by a certain amount of what may
be called clearing of the ground and defining of the terms involved.
At the outset it may be asked what does this proposed title comprehend? Is this
title of the Philosophy of Hinduism of the same nature as that of the Philosophy of
Religion? I wish I could commit myself one way or the other on this point. Indeed I
cannot. I have read a good deal on the subject, but I confess I have not got a clear
idea of what is meant by Philosophy of Religion. This is probably due to two facts. In
the first place while religion is something definite, there is nothing definite*
[f1] as to
what is to be included in the term philosophy. In the second place Philosophy and
Religion have been adversaries if not actual antagonists as may be seen from the
story of the philosopher and the theologian. According to the story, the two were
engaged in disputation and the theologian accused the philosopher that he was "like
a blind man in a dark room, looking for a black cat which was not there". In reply the
philosopher charged the theologian saying that "he was like a blind man in the dark
room, looking for a black cat which was not there but he declared to have found
there". Perhaps it is the unhappy choice of the title — Philosophy of Religion—which
is responsible for causing confusion in the matter of the exact definition of its field.
The nearest approach to an intelligible statement as to the exact subject matter of
Philosophy of Religion I find in Prof. Pringle-Pattison who observes[f2] :—
"A few words may be useful at the outset as an indication of what we commonly
mean by the Philosophy of Religion. Plato described philosophy long ago as the
synoptic view of things. That is to say, it is the attempt to see things together-to keep
all the main features of the world in view, and to grasp them in their relation to one
another as parts of one whole. Only thus can we acquire a sense of proportion and
estimate aright the significance of any particular range of facts for our ultimate
conclusions about the nature of the world-process and the world-ground.
Accordingly, the philosophy of any particular department of experience, the
Philosophy of Religion, the Philosophy of Art, the Philosophy of Law, is to be taken
as meaning an analysis and interpretation of the experience in question in its
bearing upon our view of man and the world in which he lives. And when the facts
upon which we concentrate are so universal, and in their nature so remarkable, as
those disclosed by the history of religion—the philosophy of man's religious
experience—cannot but exercise a determining influence upon our general
philosophical conclusions. In fact with many writers the particular discussion tends to
merge in the more general."
"The facts with which a philosophy of religion has to deal are supplied by the
history of religion, in the most comprehensive sense of that term. As Tiele puts it, "all
religions of the civilised and uncivilised world, dead and living", is a `historical and
psychological phenomenon' in all its manifestations. These facts, it should be noted,
constitute the data of the philosophy of religion; they do not themselves constitute a
`philosophy' or, in Tiele's use of the term, a `science' of religion. `If, he says, 1 have
minutely described all the religions in existence, their doctrines, myths and customs,
the observances they inculcate, and the organisation of their adherents, tracing the
different religions from their origin to their bloom and decay, I have merely. Collected
the materials with which the science of religion works'. 'The historical record,
however complete, is not enough; pure history is not philosophy. To achieve a
philosophy of religion we should be able to discover in the varied manifestations a
common principle to whose roots in human nature we can point, whose evolution we
can trace by intelligible-stages from lower to higher and more adequate forms, as
well as its intimate relations with the other main factors in human civilisation".
If this is Philosophy of Religion it appears to me that it is merely a different name
for that department of study, which is called comparative religion with the added aim
of discovering a common principle in the varied manifestations of religion. Whatever
be the scope and value of such a study, I am using the title Philosophy of Religion to
denote something quite different from the sense and aim given to it by Prof. Pringle￾Pattison. I am using the word Philosophy in its original sense, which was two-fold. It
meant teachings as it did when people spoke of the philosophy of Socrates or the
philosophy of Plato. In another sense it meant critical reason used in passing
judgements upon things and events. Proceeding on this basis Philosophy of Religion
is to me not a merely descriptive science. I regard it as being both descriptive as well
as normative. In so far as it deals with the teachings of a Religion, Philosophy of
Religion becomes a descriptive science. In so far as it involves the use of critical
reason for passing judgement on those teachings, the Philosophy of Religion
becomes a normative science. From this it will be clear what I shall be concerned
with in this study of the Philosophy of Hinduism. To be explicit I shall be putting
Hinduism on its trial to assess its worth as a way of life.
Here is one part of the ground cleared. There remains another part to be cleared.
That concerns the ascertainment of the factors concerned and the definitions of the
terms I shall be using.
A study of the Philosophy of Religion it seems to me involves the determination of
three dimensions. I call them dimensions because they are like the unknown
quantities contained as factors in a product. One must ascertain and define these
dimensions of the Philosophy of Religion if an examination of it is to be fruitful.
Of the three dimensions, Religion is the first. One must therefore define what he
understands by religion in order to avoid argument being directed at cross-purposes.
This is particularly necessary in the case of Religion for the reason that there is no
agreement as to its exact definition. This is no place to enter upon an elaborate
consideration of this question. I will therefore content myself by stating the meaning
in which I am using the word in the discussion, which follows.
I am using the word Religion to mean Theology. This will perhaps be insufficient for
the purposes of definition. For there are different kinds of Theologies and I must
particularise which one I mean. Historically there have been two Theologies spoken
of from ancient times. Mythical theology and Civil theology. The Greeks who
distinguished them gave each a definite content. By Mythical theology they meant
the tales of gods and their doings told in or implied by current imaginative literature.
Civil theology according to them consisted of the knowledge of the various feasts
and fasts of the State Calendar and the ritual appropriate to them. I am not using the
word theology in either of these two senses of that word. I mean by theology natural
theology[f3] which is-the doctrine of God and the divine, as an integral part of the
theory of nature. As traditionally understood there are three thesis which `natural
theology' propounds. (1) That God exists and is the author of what we call nature or
universe (2) That God controls all the events which make nature and (3) God
exercises a government over mankind in accordance with his sovereign moral law.
I am aware there is another class of theology known as Revealed Theology—
spontaneous self disclosure of divine reality—which may be distinguished
from Natural theology. But this distinction does not really matter. For as has been
pointed out[f4] that a revelation may either "leave the results won by Natural
theology standing without modifications, merely supplementing them by further
knowledge not attainable by unassisted human effort" or it "may transform Natural
theology in such a way that all the truths of natural theology would acquire richer and
deeper meaning when seen in the light of a true revelation." But the view that a
genuine natural theologyand a genuine revelation theology might stand in real
contradiction may be safely excluded as not being possible.
Taking the three thesis of Theology namely (1) the existence of God, (2) God's
providential government of the universe and (3) God's moral government of
mankind, I take Religion to mean the propounding of an ideal scheme of divine
governance the aim and object of which is to make the social order in which men live
a moral order. This is what I understand by Religion and this is the sense in which I
shall be using the term Religion in this discussion.
The second dimension is to know the ideal scheme for which a Religion stands. To
define what is the fixed, permanent and dominant part in the religion of any society
and to separate its essential characteristics from those which are unessential is
often very difficult. The reason for this difficulty in all probability lies in the difficulty
pointed out by Prof. Robertson Smith[f5] when he says:—
"The traditional usage of religion had grown up gradually in the course of many
centuries, and reflected habits of thought, characteristic of very diverse stages of
man's intellectual and moral development. No conception of the nature of the gods
could possibly afford the clue to all parts of that motley complex of rites and
ceremonies which the later paganism had received by inheritance, from a series of
ancestors in every state of culture from pure savagery upwards. The record of the
religious thought of mankind, as it is embodied in religious institutions, resembles the
geological record of the history of the earth's crust; the new and the old are
preserved side by side, or rather layer upon layer".
The same thing has happened in India. Speaking about the growth of Religion in
India, says Prof. Max Muller :—
"We have seen a religion growing up from stage to stage, from the simplest
childish prayers to the highest metaphysical abstractions. In the majority of the
hymns of the Veda we might recognise the childhood; in the Brahmanas and their
sacrificial, domestic and moral ordinances the busy manhood; in the Upanishads the
old age of theVedic religion. We could have well understood if, with the historical
progress of the Indian mind, they had discarded the purely childish prayers as soon
as they had arrived at the maturity of the Brahamans; and if, when the vanity of
sacrifices and the real character of the old god's had once been recognised, they
would have been superseded by the more exalted religion of the Upanishads. But it
was not so. Every religious thought that had once found expression in India, that had
once been handed down as a sacred heirloom, was preserved, and the thoughts of
the three historical periods, the childhood, the manhood, and the old age of the
Indian nation, were made to do permanent service in the three stages of the life of
every individual. Thus alone can we explain how the same sacred code, the Veda,
contains not only the records of different phases of religious thought, but of doctrines
which we may call almost diametrically opposed to each other."
But this difficulty is not so great in the case of Religions which
are positive religions. The fundamental characteristic of positive Religions, is that
they have not grown up like primitive religions, under the action. of unconscious
forces operating silently from age to age, but trace their origin to the teaching of
great religious innovators, who spoke as the organs of a divine revelation. Being the
result of conscious formulations the philosophy of a religion which is positive is easy
to find and easy to state. Hinduism like Judaism, Christianity and Islam is in the main
a positive religion. One does not have to search for its scheme of divine governance.
It is not like an unwritten constitution. On the Hindu scheme of divine governance is
enshrined in a written constitution and any one who cares to know it will find it laid
bare in that Sacred Book called the Manu Smriti, a divine Code which lays down the
rules which govern the religious, ritualistic and social life of the Hindus in minute
detail and which must be regarded as the Bible of the Hindus and containing the
philosophy of Hinduism.
The third dimension in the philosophy of religion is the criterion[f6] to be adopted for
judging the value of the ideal scheme of divine governance for which a given
Religion stands. Religion must be put on its trial. By what criterion shall it be judged?
That leads to the definition of the norm. Of the three dimensions this third one is the
most difficult one to be ascertained and defined.
Unfortunately the question does not appear to have been tackled although much
has been written on the philosophy of Religion and certainly no method has been
found for satisfactorily dealing with the problem. One is left to one's own method for
determining the issue. As for myself I think it is safe to proceed on the view that to
know the philosophy of any movement or any institution one must study the
revolutions which the movement or the institution has undergone. Revolution
is the mother of philosophy and if it is not the mother of philosophy it is a lamp which illuminates philosophy. Religion is no exception to this rule. To me therefore it seems
quite evident that the best method to ascertain the criterion by which to judge the
philosophy of Religion is to study the Revolutions which religion has undergone.
That is the method which I propose to adopt.
Students of History are familiar with one Religious Revolution. That Revolution was
concerned with the sphere of Religion and the extent of its authority. There was a
time when Religion had covered the whole field of human knowledge and claimed
infallibility for what it taught. It covered astronomy and taught a theory of the
universe according to which the earth is at rest in the center of the universe, while
the sun, moon, planets and system of fixed stars revolve round it each in its own
sphere. It included biology and geology and propounded the view that the growth of
life on the earth had been created all at once and had contained from the time of
creation onwards, all the heavenly bodies that it now contains and all kinds of
animals of plants. It claimed medicine to be its province and taught that disease was
either a divine visitation as punishment for sin or it was the work of demons and that
it could be cured by the intervention of saints, either in person or through their holy
relics; or by prayers or
pilgrimages; or (when due to demons) by exorcism and by treatment which the
demons (and the patient) found disgusting. It also claimed physiology and
psychology to be its domain and taught that the body and soul were two distinct
substances.
Bit by bit this vast Empire of Religion was destroyed. The Copernican Revolution
freed astronomy from the domination of Religion. The Darwinian Revolution freed
biology and geology from the trammels of Religion. The authority of theology in
medicine is not yet completely destroyed. Its intervention in medical questions still
continues. Opinion on such subjects as birth control, abortion and sterilisation of the
defective are still influenced by theological dogmas. Psychology has not completely
freed itself from its entanglements. None the less Darwinism was such a severe
blow that the authority of theology was shattered all over to such an extent that it
never afterwards made any serious effort to remain its lost empire.
It is quite natural that this disruption of the Empire of Religion should be treated as
a great Revolution. It is the result of the warfare which science waged against
theology for 400 years, in which many pitched battles were fought between the two
and the excitement caused by them was so great that nobody could fail to be
impressed by the revolution that was blazing on.
There is no doubt that this religious revolution has been a great blessing. It has
established freedom of thought. It has enabled society " to assume control of itself,
making its own the world it once shared with superstition, facing undaunted the
things of its former fears, and so carving out for itself, from the realm of mystery in
which it lies, a sphere of unhampered action and a field of independent

thought". The process of secularisation is not only welcomed by scientists
for making civilisation—as distinguished from culture—possible, even Religious
men and women have come to feel that much of what theology taught was
unnecessary and a mere hindrance to the religious life and that this chopping of its
wild growth was a welcome process.
But for ascertaining the norm for judging the philosophy of Religion we must turn to
another and a different kind of Revolution which Religion has undergone. That
Revolution touches the nature and content of ruling conceptions of the relations of
God to man, of Society to man and of man to man. How great was this revolution
can be seen from the differences which divide savage society from civilized society.
Strange as it may seem no systematic study of this Religious Revolution has so far
been made. None the less this Revolution is so great and so immense that it has
brought about a complete transformation in the nature of Religion as it is taken to be
by savage society and by civilised society although very few seem to be aware of it.
To begin with the comparison between savage society and civilised society.
In the religion of the savage one is struck by the presence of two things. First is the
performance of rites and ceremonies, the practice of magic or tabu and the worship
of fetish or totem. The second thing that is noticeable is that the rites, ceremonies,
magic, tabu, totem and fetish are conspicuous by their connection with certain
occasions. These occasions are chiefly those, which represent the crises of human
life. The events such as birth, the birth of the first born, attaining manhood, reaching
puberty, marriage, sickness, death and war are the usual occasions which are
marked out for the performance of rites and ceremonies, the use of magic and the
worship of the totem.
Students of the origin and history of Religion have sought to explain the origin and
substance of religion by reference to either magic, tabu and totem and the rites and
ceremonies connected therewith, and have deemed the occasions with which they
are connected as of no account. Consequently we have theories explaining religion
as having arisen in magic or as having arisen in fetishism. Nothing can be a greater
error than this. It is true that savage society practices magic, believes in tabu and
worships the totem. But it is wrong to suppose that these constitute the religion or
form the source of religion. To take such a view is to elevate what is incidental to the
position of the principal. The principal thing in the Religion of the savage are the
elemental facts of human existence such as life, death, birth, marriage etc. Magic,
tabu, totem are things which are incidental. Magic, tabu, totem, fetish etc., are not
the ends. They are only the means. The end is life and the preservation of life.
Magic, tabu etc., are resorted to by the savage society not for their own sake but to
conserve life and to exercise evil influences from doing harm to life. Thus
understood the religion of the savage society was concerned with life and the
preservation of life and it is these life processes which constitute the substance
source of the religion of the savage society. So great was the concern of the savage
society for life and the preservation of life that it made them the basis of its religion.
So central were the life processes in the religion of the savage society that
everything, which affected them, became part of its religion. The ceremonies of the
savage society were not only concerned with the events of birth, attaining of
manhood, puberty, marriage, sickness, death and war they were also concerned
with food. Among pastoral peoples the flocks and herds are sacred. Among
agricultural peoples seedtime and harvest are marked by ceremonials performed
with some reference to the growth and the preservation of the crops. Likewise
drought, pestilence, and other strange, irregular phenomena of nature occasion the
performance of ceremonials. Why should such occasions as harvest and famine be
accompanied by religious ceremonies? Why is magic, tabu, totem be of such
importance to the savage. The only answer is that they all affect the preservation of
life. The process of life and its preservation form the main purpose. Life and
preservation of life is the core and centre of the Religion of the savage society. As
pointed out by Prof. Crawley the religion of the savage begins and ends with the
affirmation and conservation of life.
In life and preservation of life consists the religion of the savage. What is however
true of the religion of the savage is true of all religions wherever they are found for
the simple reason that constitutes the essence of religion. It is true that in the
present day society with its theological refinements this essence of religion has
become hidden from view and is even forgotten. But that life and the preservation of
life constitute the essence of religion even in the present day society is beyond
question. This is well illustrated by Prof. Crowley. When speaking of the religious life
of man in the present day society, he says how—
"a man's religion does not enter into his professional or social hours, his scientific
or artistic moments; practically its chief claims are settled on one day in the week
from which ordinary worldly concerns are excluded. In fact, his life is in two parts; but
the moiety with which religion is concerned is the elemental. Serious thinking on
ultimate questions of life and death is, roughly speaking, the essence of his
Sabbath; add to this the habit of prayer, giving the thanks at meals, and the
subconscious feeling that birth and death, continuation and marriage are rightly
solemnised by religion, while business and pleasure may possibly
be consecrated, but onlymetaphorically or by an overflow of religious feeling."
Comparing this description of the religious concerns of the man in the present day
society with that of the savage, who can deny that the religion is essentially the
same, both in theory and practice whether one speaks of the religion of the savage
society or of the civilised society.
It is therefore clear that savage and civilised societies agree in one respect. In both
the central interests of religion—namely in the life processes by which individuals

are preserved and the race maintained—are the same. In this there is no real
difference between the two. But they differ in two other important respects.
In the first place in the religion of the savage society there is no trace of the idea of
God. In the second place in the religion of the savage society there is no bond
between morality and Religion. In the savage society there is religion without God. In
the savage society there is morality but it is independent of Religion.
How and when the idea of God became fused in Religion it is not possible to say. It
may be that the idea of God had its origin in the worship of the Great Man in Society,
the Hero—giving rise to theism—with its faith in its living God. It may be that the idea
of God came into existence as a result of the purely philosophical speculation upon
the problem as to who created life—giving rise to Deism—with its belief in God as
Architect of the Universe.[f7] In any case the idea of God is not integral to Religion.
How it got fused into Religion it is difficult to explain. With regard to the relation
between Religion and Morality this much may be safely said. Though the relation
between God and Religion is not quite integral, the relation between Religion and
morality is. Both religion and morality are connected with the same elemental facts
of human existence—namely life, death, birth and marriage. Religion consecrates
these life processes while morality furnishes rules for their preservation. Religion in
consecrating the elemental facts and processes of life came to consecrate also the
rules laid down by Society for their preservation. Looked at from this point it is easily
explained why the bond between Religion and Morality took place. It was more
intimate and more natural than the bond between Religion and God. But when
exactly this fusion between Religion and Morality took place it is not easy to say.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that the religion of the Civilised Society differs
from that of the Savage Society into two important features. In civilised society God
comes in the scheme of Religion. In civilised society morality becomes sanctified by
Religion.
This is the first stage in the Religious Revolution I am speaking of. This Religious
Revolution must not be supposed to have been ended here with the emergence of
these two new features in the development of religion. The two ideas having become
part of the constitution of the Religion of the Civilised Society have undergone
further changes which have revolutionized their meaning and their moral
significance. The second stage of the Religious Revolution marks a very radical
change. The contrast is so big that civilized society has become split into two,
antique society and modern society, so that instead of speaking of the religion of the
civilised society it becomes necessary to speak of the religion of antique society as
against the religion of modern society.
The religious revolution, which marks off antique society from modern society, is
far greater than the religious revolution, which divides savage society from civilised
society. Its dimensions will be obvious from the differences it has brought about in

the conceptions regarding the relations between God, Society and Man. The first
point of difference relates to the composition of society. Every human being, without
choice on his own part, but simply in virtue of his birth and upbringing, becomes a
member of what we call a natural society. He belongs that is to a certain family and
a certain nation. This membership lays upon him definite obligations and duties
which he is called upon to fulfil as a matter of course and on pain of social penalties
and disabilities while at the same time it confers upon him certain social rights and
advantages. In this respect the ancient and modern worlds are alike. But in the
words of Prof. Smith[f8]:—
"There is this important difference, that the tribal or national societies of the
ancient world were not strictly natural in the modern sense of the word, for the
gods had their part and place in them equally with men. The circle into which a
man was born was not simply a group of kinsfolk and fellow citizens, but embraced
also certain divine beings, the gods of the family and of the state, which to the
ancient mind were as much a part of the particular community with which they
stood connected as the human members of the social circle. The relation between
the gods of antiquity and their worshippers was expressed in the language of
human relationship, and this language was not taken in a figurative sense but with
strict literally. If a god was spoken of as father and his worshippers as his offspring,
the meaning was that the worshippers were literally of his stock, that he and they
made up one natural family with reciprocal family duties to one another. Or, again,
if the god was addressed as king, and worshippers called themselves his servants,
they meant that the supreme guidance of the state was actually in his hands, and
accordingly the organisation of the state included provision for consulting his will
and obtaining his direction in all weighty matters, also provision for approaching
him as king with due homage and tribute.
"Thus a man was born into a fixed relation to certain gods as surely as he was
born into relation to his fellow men; and his religion, that is, the part of conduct which
was determined by his relation to the gods, was simply one side of the general
scheme of conduct prescribed for him by his position as a member of society. There
was no separation between the spheres of religion and of ordinary life. Every social
act had a reference to the gods as well as to men, for the social body was not made
up of men only, but of gods and men."
Thus in ancient Society men and their Gods formed a social and political as well as
a religious whole. Religion was founded on kinship between the God and his
worshippers. Modern Society has eliminated God from its composition. It consists of
men only.
The second point of difference between antique and modern society relates to the
bond between God and Society. In the antique world the various communitie

believed in the existence of many Gods, for they accepted as real the Gods of
their enemies as well as their own, but they did not worship the strange Gods from
whom they had no favour to expect, and on whom their gifts and offerings would
have been thrown away.... Each group had its own God, or perhaps a God and
Goddess, to whom the other Gods bore no relation whatever, "
[f9]
The God of the antique society was an exclusive God. God was owned by and
bound to one singly community. This is largely to be accounted for by
"the share taken by the Gods in the feuds and wars of their worshippers. The
enemies of the God and the enemies of his people are identical; even in the Old
Testament `the enemies of Jehovah' are originally nothing else than the enemies of
Israel. In battle each God fights for his own people, and to his aid success is
ascribed; Chemosh gives victory to Moab, and Asshyr to Assyria ; and often the
divine image or symbol accompanies the host to battle. When the ark was brought
into the camp of Israel, the Philistines said, "Gods are come into the camp ; who can
deliver us from their own practice, for when David defeated them
at Baalperazirm, part of the booty consisted in their idols which had been carried into
the field. When the Carthaginians, in their treaty with Phillip of Macedon, speak
of "the Gods that take part in the campaign," they doubtless refer to the inmates of
the sacred tent which was pitched in time of war beside the tent of the general, and
before which prisoners were sacrificed after a victory. Similarly an Arabic poet
says, "Yaguth went forth with us against Morad"; that is, the image of the God
Yaguth was carried into the fray".
This fact had produced a solidarity between God and the community.
"Hence, on the principle of solidarity between Gods and their worshippers, the
particularism characteristic of political society could not but reappear in the sphere of
religion. In the same measure as the God of a clan or town had indisputable claim to
the reverence and service of the community to which he belonged, he was
necessarily an enemy to their enemies and a stranger to those to whom they were
strangers".[f10]
God had become attached to a community, and the community had become
attached to their God. God had become the God of the Community and the
Community had become the chosen community of the God.
This view had two consequences. Antique Society never came to conceive that
God could be universal God, the God of all. Antique Society never could conceive
that there was any such thing as humanity in general.
The third point of difference between ancient and modern society, has reference to
the conception of the fatherhood of God. In the antique Society God was the Father
of his people but the basis of this conception of Fatherhood was deemed to be
physical.